Strategy / Organizations

Airborne Express & The Evolution of the Air Express Industry 1973-2002

Once again, I’m digging into my digital “crates” to share a brief writeup. This one deals with Airborne Express and the Air Express Industry. I composed this brief synopsis back in February of 2007; one year before the organization ceased operations in the United States. Airborne Express was once a low cost alternative to the FedEx-UPS duopoly and was eventually acquired by the parent company of DHL Express in 2003. DHL Supply Chain as of 2017 is the 4th largest supply chain and logistics company in North America [1]. Although DHL is a market leader in various countries internationally, the company could not find success with the Airborne Express acquisition in the United States. After five years of trying to make inroads, DHL shut down Airborne Express in 2008 and eventually lost 10 billion (USD) on the venture [2].

History and Development of the Industry

The majority of the freight industry circa 1973 was constituted of the major players in the passenger airline industry. A handful of all cargo airlines most notably Flying Tiger (founded by 10 pilots from the famous WW2 volunteer fighter unit), also participated in this space [3]. The dynamics of the industry were soon changed by Fred Smith Jr. and Federal Express. While a student a Yale, Smith envisioned “that as companies relied more on computers and technology, they would want to keep their equipment working without creating a huge inventory of parts.” [4] Federal Express pioneered the hub and spoke route system. The central hub was located in Memphis and the “spokes” were the routes between Memphis and the cities that Federal Express served. The model proved to be a success due to its many efficiencies and new entrants into the industry copied this operating process.

As federal regulations were relaxed on the air cargo industry, all-cargo carriers began to increase their route structure. The result was a substantial withdrawal from all-cargo flights by the major airlines and an increase in demand for next-day package delivery services.

The Eighties: Rapid Growth and Low Returns.

Despite the rapid growth in the air express industry during the nineteen eighties, profit margins were declining. Federal Express needed to be aware of the strong competitive force represented by UPS’s potential entry into the overnight delivery industry. UPS decided to enter the industry in 1982 and by 1984 “it had a daily volume of about 175,000 packages for its overnight and second-day service, compared with about 290,000 packages for Federal Express.” [5] UPS’s aggressive push into the industry included a strategy to compete on price and offer overnight parcel services at prices that were half that of other industry players. In 1987 Federal Express further shocked the industry by initiating price cuts on its overnight service [6]. The move was designed to preempt expansion by UPS into this space. Brazen price discounting increased the rivalry amongst established firms and inevitably led to reduced profitability in the industry.

Another threat to industry profitability came from the strong competitive force represented by the bargaining power of buyers. Powerful buyers in an industry can squeeze profits out of that industry. Major corporations that utilized the air express industry began to pool together and leveraged their purchasing power to bargain for more price reductions. “To bag a three-year deal as International Business Machines Corp.’s primary U. S. overnight carrier, Airborne Freight Corp. dangled discounts as much as 84% below Federal’s rate card. With price-cutting of that magnitude, it’s clear why a 34% jump in volume produced only 13% more revenues for the air-express industry in the first half of 1987.” [7]

Furthermore, new technologies during this time were seen as a threat to industry players. Due to the burgeoning popularity of the fax machine during the eighties, financial analysts were predicting that they could eventually displace 30% of Federal Express’s overnight-letter shipments [8].

Rising Prices in 1989

The industry during this period of time had just emerged from the shakeout phase and was entering the mature phase of the industry life cycle model. Purolator Courier, Emery, CF Air Freight and Flying Tiger had either been acquired or were marginalized due to poor operational efficiencies. As a result the industry was dominated by a small number of companies. After many years of trying to take share from FedEx and Airborne Express, UPS recognized that the market had matured at this point in time. During the mature stage of the industry life cycle model companies tend to reduce the industry competition and preserve industry profitability. UPS for the first time since it entered the air express market in 1982 began to raise prices on its next day air service. UPS wanted to convey to the rest of the industry that the price war was over. Price signaling was clearly utilized to influence the rest of the players in the industry to raise their prices. Federal Express and Airborne were more than happy to implement a tit-for-tat strategy and thus raise their prices. UPS had succeeded in raising industry profitability although the upcoming recession rendered this effect short lived.

Airborne Express Strengths and Weaknesses

Airborne Express remains a distant third in the US air express industry in terms of market share. However, the company did manage to survive the industry shakeout of the late nineteen eighties due to its distinctive competencies and low cost structure. (See Figure 1)

One of the company’s main strengths is its low cost structure relative to its peers. This low cost structure helped Airborne maintain a 16.5 share of the U.S. domestic express market in 2001, roughly the same as in previous years [10]. Airborne’s other strengths include ownership of its own airport, its exclusive grant of a foreign trade zone and its patent on C-containers. In addition, Airborne has very high brand loyalty. It won the Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Award for the parcel delivery category for five years in a row [9]. Brand loyalty is a significant asset as it helps a company retain market share.

In order to compete with its more powerful rivals in the industry, Airborne concentrated on the niche market of high volume corporate accounts. While this strategy provides constant volume it does have its drawbacks. Number one, a predominately corporate customer base will make Airborne much more sensitive to downturns in the economy. Number two, high volume customers are able to drive down prices and can command significant discounts.


Airborne needs to continue to cut its costs and increase its productivity in order to compete with the larger players in the industry. Its operating costs and capital spending were slashed from 368 million in 2000 to 126 million in 2001 [10]. On the productivity side, Airborne has taken positive steps by centralizing its customs brokerage service at its sort facility in Wilmington, Ohio. “This change will improve customer service and provide Airborne with greater regulatory control.” [11] Lower costs and productivity improvements will begin to pay off when the economy rebounds and help place the company in a more favorable position.

Airborne also needs to ramp up its domestic ground services in order to hedge against the shrinking market in high margin overnight deliveries. Domestic overnight shipments fell from 58% of total volume in 1998 to 52% in 2001 [12]. The company needs to be ready to respond to this shift in demand and capture revenues in ground delivery services.

Although airborne needs to maintain ties to its corporate customer base, it also needs to pay more attention to smaller customers. Its GDS service was introduced on a limited basis and was targeted at large corporate customers. This service needs to be expanded to individual customers and small businesses in order to take advantage of the large capital spending Airborne undertook to establish ground services. Increasing the number of shipping kiosks available to individual customers could be established through a strategic alliance with a retail partner. In this manner Airborne can compete with the Fedex/Kinko’s and UPS/Mailboxes Etc partnerships.


[1] Transport Topics: (retrieved May, 13, 2017)

[2] 0,28804,1855948_1864555_1864556,00.html (retrieved May, 13, 2017)


[4] Miller, Karin. “FedEx founder favors ‘Buck Rogers Ideas’” Fort Wayne Journal Gazette. Final Edition (2 Dec. 2001): 1D. Factiva

[5] Rotbart, Dean. “Federal Express Sinks Near Its 52-Week Low, And ‘Buy’ Recommendations Are Appearing.”  The Wall Street Journal (20 Mar 1984): Factiva

[6] Foust,Dean “Top Of The News FEDERAL EXPRESS DELIVERS A PRICE SHOCK — It’s firing the first shot in what could be an industrywide war” Businessweek (30 March 1987): Vol 2991, pg 31. Factiva

[7] Foust, Dean. “The Corporation WHY FEDERAL EXPRESS HAS OVERNIGHT ANXIETY — UPS, facsimiles, and a mature market have it worried” Businessweek (9 Nov 1987): Vol 3025, pg 62. Factiva

[8] Foust, Dean “Cover Story MR. SMITH GOES GLOBAL — HE’S PUTTING FEDERAL EXPRESS’ FUTURE ON THE LINE TO EXPAND OVERSEAS”  Businessweek (13 Feb 1989): Vol 3091, pg 66. Factiva

[9] “Air & Express Briefs.” Traffic World Magazine (15 July 2002) Factiva

[10] Putzger, Ian “Airborne Again” The Journal of Commerce Week (11 Mar 2002) Factiva

[11] “Airborne Express Enhances International Express Services” PR Newswire (7 Oct 2002) Factiva

[12] “Moody’s Lowers Airborne Express Senior Notes To Ba1” Dow Jones Corporate Filings Alert (15 Mar 2002) Factiva

More Than You Want to Know About State Street Bank’s Technology Strategy Part 3

This article is a continuation of my earlier analyses (Part 1, Part 2 here) where I waded into State Street’s strategy for Technology Infrastructure, IT Capability and Staffing, Information Risk & Security, Stakeholder Requirements, and Project ROI. In this final part of my three part series I will broach the company’s strategy for Data Acquisition, Social Media, Organizational Change Management and Project Strategy. State Street’s cloud implementation and virtualization initiative is a worthy example of business strategy/need influencing the firm’s information technology strategy.

State Street: Strategy for Data Acquisition and Impact on Business Processes:

The nature of State Street’s business as a custodian bank with trillions of dollars under custody management and multiple clients distributed worldwide means that the organization houses and processes a tremendous amount of data (internally generated and externally collected). The sheer volume and complexity of this data presents challenges as the bank looks to file regulatory reports and provide data back to its clients. The company receives an untenable 50,000 faxes a month from its client base (Garber, 2016). According to consulting firm Accenture, “(State Street) was unable to adequately track trades through each step in the trading lifecycle because there were multiple reconciliation systems, some reconciliation work was still being done manually and there was no system of record. To maintain industry leadership and comply with regulations, the company’s IT platform had to advance” (Alter, Daugherty, Harris, & Modruson, 2016).

The bank’s cloud initiative helped facilitate and speed up the burdensome process of transferring data back and forth between its clients. In addition, (as of 2016) a new digital initiative (code named State Street Beacon) will potentially help drive more cost savings. The cloud architecture project was a boon to data analysis capabilities as it enabled clients to access their data in the State Street cloud and subsequently enrich the data from multiple sources to support forecasting (Camhi, 2014). In this case, the bank’s infrastructure as a service (IaaS) enabled platform as a service (PaaS) capabilities.

The bank has embarked upon the development of 70 multiple mobile apps and services that support its PaaS strategy. In one case, the bank developed a tablet and mobile accessible app for its client base named State Street Springboard. This application put investment portfolio data in the hands of its client base. Additionally, “Since State Street’s core competency is transaction processing, its Gold Copy app is one of the most important new tools it offers: The app lets a manager follow a single ‘gold’ version of a transaction as it moves through all of the company’s many departments and office locations — say, as it makes it way through trading, accounting, and reporting offices globally” (Hogan, 2012). This capability of the Gold Copy app enables more effective management of counterparty risk as an asset moves through the trading process.

State Street’s new infrastructure and massive data collection provides the bank with new big data capabilities that can better inform business units in the area of risk management. Data insights can potentially fortify stress testing, “What-If” and “Black Swan” scenario modeling. As we’ve seen in the recent 2016 case of Britain’s pending withdrawal from the European Union (i.e. “Brexit”), uncertainty in global financial markets is a certainty.

State Street: Strategy for Social Media/Web Presence:

            State Street has traditional Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter social presences but it has also used other social platforms to support various aims such as employee interaction and brand awareness. The bank was named a “Social Business Leader for 2013” by Information Week. As part of a “social IT” strategy (in which technology supports a collaboration initiative), the company held an “Innovation Rally” on its eight internal online forums to gather employee ideas on how best to improve its business. From 12,000 total submitted postings, employees could attempt to build a business case around the best ideas for executive management to implement (Carr, 2013). The company also launched an internal “State Street Collaborate” platform with the aim of crowdsourcing employee knowledge to help people find an appropriate in-house expert regarding diverse work related topics of interest.

Additional social initiatives include a partnership with TED to provide employees the opportunity to give a “Ted Talk” in front of their peers; the aim is to promote knowledge sharing within the organization. The bank also experiments with a presence on the (almost defunct) video sharing platform “Vine” where it can showcase the organization in quick six second sound bites. This approach caters to clients and the future millennial talent base.

State Street: Strategy for Organizational Change Management, Project Strategy and Complexity:

            As stated earlier in this series, State Street started migrating its new cloud applications to production by selecting those with low volume and low complexity and then gradually ramped up to migrating the more complex applications (McKendrick, 2013). The standardization and virtualization aspects of cloud infrastructure that the bank implemented is conducive to agile development. Standardization and a reusable code approach reduces complexity by limiting development choices, simplifying maintenance and enabling new technology staff to get up to speed on fewer systems. Developers are placed in agile teams with business subject matter experts to provide guidance and to increase stakeholder buy-in. Per Perretta, “We circle the agile approach with additional governance to ensure that the investments are paying off in the appropriate timeframe” (High, 2016).

Another key approach the State Street uses to gauge project complexity is that of predictive analytics. The bank can help its internal business teams better understand the project costs and delivery timetables by analyzing historical data on all of the projects implemented over the years. The predictive analytics model uses inputs such as “…scope, team sizes, capability of the team, the amount of hours each team member spent, and ultimately, how well it delivered on these programs” (Merrett, 2015). As the business teams list their project requirements, the predictive model is created in real time which provides all parties with additional clarity.

Finally, it would be remiss to mention banking and transformation in the same breath without mentioning the requisite layoffs and outsourcing activities. For all the benefits of the bank’s cloud computing initiatives, technology workers who do not fit in with the new paradigm find themselves subjected to domestic and non-domestic outsourcing activities. A standardized infrastructure platform leads to fewer distinct systems in the technology ecosystem, an emphasis on code reuse and increased automation. This perfect storm of efficiency gains has lead to roughly 850 IT employees shuffled out of the organization to either IBM, India based Wipro or outright unemployment. Staffing cuts occurred amongst the employees who maintained and monitored mainframes and worked with other non-cloud based infrastructure systems. The bank was interested in shifting fixed costs for variable costs by unloading IT staff who were perceived as not working on innovative cutting edge technologies. The layoffs amount to “21% of State Street’s 4,000 IT employees worldwide” (Tucci, 2011b).


Alter, A., Daugherty, R., Harris, J., & Modruson, F., (2016). A Fresh Start for Enterprise IT. Accenture. Retrieved from


Camhi, J. (2014). Chris Perretta Builds Non-Stop Change Into State Street’s DNA. Bank Systems & technology. Retrieved from

Carr, D. (May 30, 2013). State Street: Social Business Leader Of 2013. Retrieved 6/25/16 from


Garber, K. (February 29, 2016). State Street doubles down on digital. SNL Bank and Thrift Daily. Retrieved from Factiva 6/20/16.

High, P. (February 8, 2016). State Street Emphasizes Importance Of Data Analytics And Digital Innovation In New Role. Retrieved from

Hogan, M. (September 3, 2012). State Street’s Trip to the Cloud. Barron’s. Retrieved from Factiva 6/20/16

McKendrick, J. (January 7, 2013). State Street’s Transformation Unfolds, Driven by Cloud Computing. Forbes. Retrieved from

Merrett, R. (April 2, 2015). How predictive analytics helped State Street avoid additional IT project costs. CIO. Retrieved from

Tucci. L. (July, 20, 2011). State Street tech layoffs: IT transformation’s dark side. Retrieved from

Get Out of the Spreadsheet Abyss

When an organization turns a blind eye to the proliferation of spreadsheet based processes, it subjects itself to substantial risks. Have you ever encountered (or enabled) the following scenario?

  • Enterprise reporting is lacking thus a “power-user” (i.e. analyst) is conscripted into cobbling together an ad-hoc spreadsheet based process to address the management request;
  • The power user exports data from various business applications and then manipulates the data output typically with macros and formulas;
  • This initial spreadsheet is manually integrated with business unit data from various other unofficial spreadsheets, further distancing the data from the source business application;
  • Multiple tabs are added, charts are generated and data is pivoted (all manually);
  • Management finds value in the report and elevates it to a repeatable process;
  • The original request increases in complexity over time as it requires more manipulations, calculations and rogue data sources to meet management needs;
  • Management doubles down with the need for a new request and the process is repeated;
  • IT proper is NEVER consulted on any of the requests;

The business unit is now supporting a “spreadmart”. The term is considered derogatory in data circles.

“A spreadmart (spreadsheet data mart) is a business data analysis system running on spreadsheets or other desktop databases that is created and maintained by individuals or groups to perform the tasks normally done by a data mart or data warehouse. Typically a spreadmart is created by individuals at different times using different data sources and rules for defining metrics in an organization, creating a fractured view of the enterprise.” [1]

Although the initial intentions of these requests may be reasonable, the business never bothers to approach IT to propose building out a proper data store. Additionally, the conscripted analysts are unhappy with their additional manual responsibilities. Spreadsheet wrangling and manual integration activities shift precious time away from more value-added pursuits such as data analysis and formulating recommendations.

From management’s perspective, why should they pay IT to build out an officially sanctioned solution that will deliver the same information that an internal team of analysts can provide? After all, the spreadmart is responsive (changes can be made quickly) and it’s inexpensive (as opposed to new investments in IT). Eventually, the manual processes are baked into the job description and new hires are enlisted to expand and maintain this system. The business sinks deeper and deeper into the spreadsheet abyss.

The short term rewards of the spreadmart are generally not worth the longer term risks.


“It’s not an enterprise tool. The error rates in spreadsheets are huge. Excel will dutifully average the wrong data right down the line. There’s no protection around that.” [2]

The spreadmart can also be bracketed as a “data shadow” system to borrow a term from The Business Intelligence Guidebook, authored by Rick Sherman. Here are the problems associated with “data shadow” systems as paraphrased from The Business Intelligence Guidebook [3]:

  • Productivity is severely diminished as analysts spend their time creating and maintaining an assortment of manual data processes;
    • I would add that team morale suffers as well;
  • Business units have daggers drawn as they try to reconcile and validate whose numbers are “more correct”;
    • As a result of a new silo, the organization has compounded its data governance issues;
  • Data errors can (and will) occur as a result of manual querying, integrating and calculating;
  • Data sources can change without notice and the data shadow process is not on IT’s radar for source change notifications;
  • Embedded business logic becomes stagnant in various complex macros or code modules because they are hidden or simply not understood by inheritors;
  • The solution doesn’t scale with increasing data volume or number of users;
  • Audit trail to ensure control and compliance does not exist;
    • “It is often ironic that a finance group can pass an audit because the IT processes it uses are auditable, but the data shadow systems that they use to make decisions are not, and are ignored in an internal audit”;
  • Process and technical documentation does not exist which impacts the ability to update the solution;

Additionally, these processes are not backed up with any regularity, multiple versions may exist on multiple users’ desktops and anyone can make changes to the embedded business logic. The bottom line is that the business is potentially making decisions based upon erroneous data which can have serious financial and reputational impacts.

“F1F9 estimated that 88 percent of all spreadsheets have errors in them, while 50 percent of spreadsheets used by large companies have material defects. The company said the mistakes are not just costly in terms of time and money – but also lead to damaged reputations, lost jobs and disrupted careers.” [4]


There is nothing wrong with the business responding to an emerging issue by requesting a one-time ad-hoc solution. The highest risks emerge when the ad-hoc process is systematized and a number of repeatable ad-hoc processes proliferate unchecked; and IT is never involved in any discussions.

IT proper is highly effective when it is allowed to merge, integrate and validate data. Business unit analysts and spreadsheets should be out of the collection and integration game for repeatable management reporting. Analysts should focus on analysis, trending and interpretation. Too often analysts get tossed into productivity traps involving hours of cutting, pasting and linking to someone else’s spreadsheet for data integration in order to meet management demands.

When IT is brought into the discussion, they must not point fingers but rather understand why the shadow system was established in the first place. Likewise, the business unit should not point fingers at IT for being unresponsive or limited by budget constraints. Once the peace treaty has been established, IT should analyze and reverse-engineer the cobbled together integration processes and data sources (which admittedly is a time consuming event) and deliver more controlled and scalable processes.

The new data integration processes should culminate in loading data to a business specific, validated, central data mart. The central mart doesn’t try to impose an unfamiliar tool upon the business but rather automates integration activities and references more “trustworthy” data sources. Spreadsheets can still be used by analysts to access the data but the analysts are not expected to be manual aggregators using a sub-standard ETL tool.

“Go with the flow. Some users will never give up their spreadsheets, regardless of how robust an analytic environment you provide. Let them keep their spreadsheets, but configure them as front ends to the data warehouse. This way, they can use their spreadsheets to access corporate-approved data, metrics and reports. If they insist on creating new reports, provide an incentive for them to upload their reports to the data warehouse instead of distributing them via e-mail.” [5]

Have I ever had to “get out” of a situation where data governance was lacking and burned-out, morale depleted analysts spent all of their time collecting and integrating spreadsheets to maintain an inefficient spreadmart?

I’ll never tell!




[3] Sherman, R. (2015). Business intelligence guidebook: from data integration to analytics.



AOL Time-Warner: You’ve Got Merger

Most people have fond memories of nineties staple AOL which was purchased by Verizon networks for $4.4 billion in 2015. AOL was a true internet pioneer that provided many customers their first taste of dial-up internet access. After its much ballyhooed purchase of “old media” company Time-Warner in 2000, AOL Time-Warner began a slow decline in popularity as emerging broadband technology cut into its market share. By 2003, the combined company posted a $99 billion dollar loss.

The AOL Time-Warner association finally unraveled in 2009 as Time-Warner was spun off. The AOL Time-Warner merger remains (as of 2017) the biggest in US history at roughly $166 billion dollars. Currently, Time-Warner’s market capitalization is north of $75 billion, while AOL’s is estimated at about $2.5 billion.

Fast forward seventeen years after the merger; communications behemoth Verizon plans to launch a new division called “Oath” which will house AOL and its other media properties. I suppose the name is a reaction to the “fake news” phenomenon which surfaced in the 2016 election cycle. One of Oath’s more prominent holdings includes another nineties staple, Yahoo; which was recently purchased by Verizon for $4.8 billion.

The reason I decided to take this AOL trip down memory lane was to share a brief case write-up I generated back in March of 2007 for an MBA strategy class. The write-up briefly discusses the history of AOL and its fateful merger with Time-Warner. Keep in mind that this perspective is from 2007.

History and Development

The media conglomerate known as AOL Time-Warner was formed when America Online, Inc merged with Time-Warner Inc. on January 11, 2001. At the time of the announcement, Time-Warner was the world’s largest media and entertainment company with revenues of 26.8 billion dollars, approximately 5 and half times more than AOL’s 4.8 billion [1]. This 166 billion dollar marriage of leading companies in content assets and internet distribution was the largest proposed merger ever.

AOL initially began operations as Quantum Computer Services. “In 1985, Quantum began offering a graphical-user interface (GUI) BBS for PCs and soon expanded GUI services to Apple and Tandy computers. [2]” The company was renamed America Online in 1989 and concentrated on providing easy online access to a predominately technically illiterate mainstream audience. By the time of the merger with Time-Warner, AOL had grown to be the nations largest online company with close to 22 million subscribers.

Time, was originally founded by Henry Luce and Briton Hadden with $86,375 borrowed from friends and Yale classmates [3]. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc was formed by brothers Harry, Allen, Sam & Jack in 1923 [4]. In 1990 Time Inc merged with Warner Communications. The 18 billion dollar merger would allow Time to benefit from Warner’s strong international distribution, while Warner would gain from Time’s strong programming [5].

Flat Rate Pricing

AOL initially employed a two part pricing strategy for access to its services. Members were offered a $19.95 rate for 20 hours use and then charged $2.95 for each additional hour they spent online. AOL at this point in time was subjected to very strong competitive forces in the marketplace. The company had previously stuck to its two part pricing strategy even though it had trouble keeping subscribers because smaller rivals were offering unlimited use of the Internet for a single fee.  When AOL’s second biggest competitor Microsoft attempted to set price with a flat pricing scheme of $19.95 for unlimited access, AOL had to match in order to keep its subscribers from defecting.

The shift in pricing strategy had a tremendous effect on the demand for AOL’s service. The subsequent surge in demand illustrates that the demand for AOL’s services was elastic. The price elasticity of demand for certain products or services is highly contingent upon the number and closeness of the substitutes available. For internet access there were many options that were available to consumers during the mid nineties. Thus if the price of a close substitute were to be reduced, buyers of other products would be enticed to switch to the lower cost option. In AOL’s case, buyers switched to the option that offered the most value for the same price as associated switching costs were negligible. The value associated with AOL was its exclusive content and proprietary network in addition to broader internet connectivity. Competitive flat rate pricing along with AOL’s strong brand reputation and a highly elastic demand helped increase its subscriber base and kept its current subscribers from switching to Microsoft’s rival MSN service.

AOL’s Quest for Bandwidth

In the late nineties AOL realized that consumers in the future would demand higher speed connectivity to online content. Unfortunately the only service that AOL offered at this point in time was low bandwidth connectivity via dial-up. The company was at an inflection point where it could decide to stay with a maturing technology or invest in ways to stay competitive as the internet connectivity landscape transitioned. Several high bandwidth options were in the running to become the dominant technology of the future. Of these technologies, access via cable modems using the coaxial cable used to transmit TV signals looked to be the most promising. AOL realized that it would have to develop new strategies to stay competitive in the upcoming high growth mass market populated by the early majority of cable modem users.

AOL’s competitors, Microsoft and AT&T, made significant investments or outright purchases of existing cable operators. As a prerequisite for the acquisition of TCI by AT&T, AOL lobbied the FCC to force TCI to open its cable networks to rival ISPs. “Predictably, this proposal did not sit well with cable operators, especially since they have spent billions on infrastructure upgrades to sell their own Internet-over-cable services.” [6] This strategy proved to be unsuccessful for AOL so predictably the company forged ahead with plays in other broadband categories such as satellite and DSL technologies. Strategic alliances with Hughes Electronics, Bell Atlantic and SBC Communications allowed AOL to hedge against a proliferation in broadband connectivity.

 Strategy Behind the Merger

In theory, the merger of AOL and Time-Warner would allow both companies to realize substantial synergies. According to Steve Case, “We will draw on one another’s strengths, combining AOL’s superior distribution capacity and Internet expertise with Time-Warner’s programming and cable network assets,” [7]. The combined conglomerate would give the new company unprecedented reach across traditional and new internet media. As an example, the conglomerate could offer a multimedia package to advertisers encompassing AOL’s internet offerings and Time-Warner’s traditional media properties. In addition AOL would finally gain access to a cable network allowing it to provide high speed access via the promising coaxial cable method.

Another justification for the merger was the expected costs savings that the new company would realize. For example,” AOL will also be able to shave significant customer acquisition costs by taking advantage of Time-Warner’s vast CD music printing business. One of AOL’s most expensive marketing costs is outsourcing the pressing of its software CDs, which are sent to prospective customers. “ [8] AOL Time-Warner would be presented with bundling opportunities as hit music CDs could contain AOL marketing material and software.

 Beyond 2002

Two years after the historic merger with Time-Warner, AOL’s advertising revenue has dropped and its subscription growth has slowed. As the internet landscape has moved towards broadband, AOL still heavily relies upon dial-up service. A key problem for AOL at this juncture is how to keep users from defecting when they switched to high speed access over cable modems? AOL most concentrate on enriching its content to remain a viable player in the internet landscape. “Content, broadly defined-from downloading music and films to exclusive movie and news clips to prime-time series previews (“The Sopranos” and “Friends”) to the pages of Time magazine-also will be the catalyst that entices dial-up, narrowband subscribers to the more lucrative broadband front as AOL transforms itself into the HBO of the Internet.” [9]

Secondly AOL Time-Warner should concentrate on acquiring more cable operations in order to increase the reach of its broadband services. In 2002 Cablevision was selling at about 25% of its value and Adelphia has indicated that it will sell some of its best cable assets as well [10].


[1] Sutel, Seth. “Time Warner being acquired by AOL for about $166 billion”  Associated Press Newswires (10 January 2000): Factiva




[5] Coy, Peter. “Time Inc. and Warner Communications Merge” The Associated Press. (4 March 1999): Factiva

[6] “Coax Access Fight Goes Regional City Councils Weigh TCI-AT&T Merger” ISP Business News Vol. 5, Issue: 3 (18 January 1999): Factiva

[7] Auchard, Eric “FOCUS – AOL, Time Warner agree to world’s biggest merger.” Reuters News

By Eric Auchard (10 January 2000): Factiva

[8] Cho, Joshua “AOL-TW Synergies Meet with Skepticism.(Company Business and Marketing)” Cable World Volume 12; Issue 11 (13 March 2000): Factiva

[9] Mermigas, Diane “AOL and ABC should emphasize content” Electronic Media Vol: 21 Num: 48 (2 December 2002): Factiva

[10] Gilpin, Kenneth “Cable Industry Plays Catchup” The New York Times (19 May 2002): Factiva



More Than You Want to Know About State Street Bank’s Technology Strategy Part 2

This article is a continuation of my earlier analysis (Part 1 here) where I waded into State Street’s strategy for Technology Infrastructure and IT Capability and Staffing. In this second part of my three part series I will broach the company’s strategy for information risk and security, stakeholder requirements and project return on investment. State Street’s cloud implementation and virtualization initiative is a good example of business strategy/need influencing the firm’s information technology strategy.

State Street: Strategy for Information Risk & Security:

State Street has acquired a substantial client base and houses sensitive financial data that is subjected to regulatory scrutiny. Given the sensitive nature of its data and operations, the cloud infrastructure that the bank chose to implement was that of a virtualized private cloud. Former Chief Innovation Officer Madge Meyer stated, “We’re totally virtualized, our network is a virtual private IP network. Our servers are 72 percent virtualized and our storage is all virtualized for structured/unstructured data” (Burger, 2011). For State Street, a private cloud offers the benefits of a public cloud with the added benefit of being owned and operated by the bank (i.e. exclusive dedication). While no architecture is 100% secure, the risk of an information breach is mitigated as the controlling organization’s data can be completely isolated from the data of another organization.

Additionally, the cloud implementation and virtualization initiative gave rise to shared services that are centrally managed but enforced across the enterprise. This single security framework can be applied across all of the application touch points precluding the need for multiple security frameworks across disparate systems.

State Street: Strategy for Stakeholder Requirements, Testing & Training/Support:

The architecture group within State Street works together with the business to tie together strategic objectives. The idea to embrace cloud implementation (and the additional data functionality it enabled for the bank’s clients) emanated in the architecture group. Thus, the business and the board of directors were key stakeholders in the initiative. The board of directors has a special dedicated technology committee that receives “a complete rundown of the technology strategy and the work that we (IT group) are doing in terms of digitizing the business” (High, 2016). According to Perretta, “They (architecture group) created a proof of concept with an eye toward: Here are the capabilities that our entire organization is going to need, here are the technologies that we can deploy, and here’s how to make them operational” (Camhi, 2014).

State Street started migrating its new cloud applications to production by selecting those with low volume and low complexity and then gradually ramped up to migrating the more complex applications (McKendrick, 2013). Dual pilots of the cloud architecture were conducted using roughly 100 machines. Once favorable results were achieved, a larger pilot consisting of 500 machines was stood up. Approximately 120 use cases were tested in the pilot in order to let the development team understand the failure points of the system (Tucci, 2011a).

The standardization and virtualization aspects of the cloud infrastructure the bank implemented was conducive to agile development. Virtual machines on the cloud allowed development teams to spin up multiple server instances as opposed to physically installing a new box in the legacy non-virtualized environment. Contention between teams waiting for server use is virtually eliminated. “When adding cloud computing to agile development, builds are faster and less painful, which encourages experimentation” (Kannan, 2012). The relative ease at which development and testing servers can be instantiated promotes “spur of the moment” experimental builds that could yield additional innovative features and capabilities.

State Street: Project ROI and Key Success Measures:

Prior to State Street’s cloud infrastructure upgrade initiatives, potential operating cost savings were projected to be $575 million to $625 million by the end of 2014; which State Street is on track to achieve. “The bank had pretax run-rate expense savings from the initiative of $86 million in 2011, $112 million in 2012, and $220 million in 2013” (Camhi, 2014).

When the IT group makes a budget request for substantial investments, they must lay out the potential benefits to the business. Some of the benefits are timely payback, regulatory compliance, data quality improvement and faster development cycle times (providing features and functionality with re-use and less coding). The ultimate aim is to connect the IT strategy to business results in a way that yields advantage for the organization.

In 2011, State Street published a matrix on the advantages of cloud computing vs. traditional IT. The following figure provides insight into State Street’s IT and business unit considerations with respect to making an investment in a fixed or variable cost infrastructure (Pryor, 2011).

Traditional IT Cloud Computing
Cash Flow Hardware / software purchased upfront Costs incurred on a pay-as-you-go basis
Risk Entire risk taken upfront with uncertain return Financial risk is taken incrementally and matched to return
Income Statement Impact Maintenance and depreciated capital expense Maintenance costs only
Balance Sheet Impact Hardware / software carried as a long-term asset Cost incurred on a pay-as-you-go basis

From a funding perspective, State Street employs the chargeback funding method for its private cloud initiative. Architectural capabilities empower end-users to automatically provision virtualized servers for usage. There are policies in place that determine how long a virtual server may remain instantiated and how much load balancing is performed across the infrastructure. Server usage is monitored, measured and chargeback is calculated based upon end-user processing time. Subsequently, the usage is billed back to the end-user’s respective business unit. “In short, it puts a management layer of software over the virtualized servers and operates them in a highly automated, low touch, fashion” (Babcock, 2011).

Don’t miss part 3 of the analysis:
More Than You Want to Know About State Street Bank’s Technology Strategy Part 3


Babcock, C. (November 9, 2011). 6 big questions for private cloud projects. Information Week. Retrieved from Factiva.

Burger, K. (October, 1, 2011). Riding The Innovation Wave; Technology innovation has been key to State Street Corp.’s success, according to chief innovation officer Madge Meyer — and she’s been willing to take some risks to prove it. Bank Systems + Technology. Retrieved from Factiva

Camhi, J. (2014). Chris Perretta Builds Non-Stop Change Into State Street’s DNA. Bank Systems & technology. Retrieved from

High, P. (February 8, 2016). State Street Emphasizes Importance Of Data Analytics And Digital Innovation In New Role. Retrieved from

Kannan, N. (August 20, 2012). 6 Ways the Cloud Enhances Agile Software Development. CIO. Retrieved from

McKendrick, J. (January 7, 2013). State Street’s Transformation Unfolds, Driven by Cloud Computing. Forbes. Retrieved from

Tucci. L. (July, 2011a). In search of speed, State Street’s CIO builds a private cloud. Retrieved from

Michael Porter’s Generic Differentiation Strategy Explained

I previously touched upon Michael Porter’s generic cost leadership strategy here. Porter asserts that a business model can’t offer the best product or service at the lowest price and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage. An organization employing a strategy that attempts to be “all things to all people” will become stranded in mediocrity (i.e. earn less than industry average profitability).

A differentiation strategy advocates that a business must offer products or services that are valuable and unique to buyers above and beyond a low price. The ability for a company to offer a premium price for their products or services hinges upon how valuable and unique these offerings are in the marketplace. A differentiator invests its resources to gain a competitive advantage from superior innovation, excellent quality and responsiveness to customer needs. [1]

“It should be stressed that the differentiation strategy does not allow the firm to ignore costs, but rather they are not the primary strategic target.” [2]

If you could boil the differentiation strategy down to a manageable sound-bite, it would look something like this; differentiation enables a firm to command a higher price.

Starbucks coffee doesn’t taste materially better than offerings from rival Dunkin’ Donuts, but Starbucks has crafted the “Starbucks Experience” complete with intimate environments, sustainable sourcing and mobile ordering to differentiate itself with a cult-like following (i.e. command higher than industry average prices for a commodity item).


Differentiation allows a firm to build brand loyalty, obtain customers who exhibit less price sensitivity and increase its profit margins. As opposed to cost leaders, differentiators are not as concerned with supplier price increases. Differentiators can more easily pass on price increases to their customers because customers are more willing to pay the increases.

Differentiators are protected from powerful buyers since only they can supply the distinct product or service offering. Differentiators are also protected against the threat of substitute products in that a new competitor must invest substantial resources to both match the capabilities of the differentiator and break customer loyalty.

“Differentiation is different from segmentation. Differentiation is concerned with how a firm competes—the ways in which it can offer uniqueness to customers. Such uniqueness might relate to consistency (McDonald’s), reliability (Federal Express), status (American Express), quality (BMW), and innovation (Apple). Segmentation is concerned with where a firm competes in terms of customer groups, localities and product types.”[1]


Porter assets that there are risks to the differentiation strategy.

  • “The cost differential between low-cost competitors and the differentiated firm becomes too great for differentiation to hold brand loyalty. Buyers thus sacrifice some of the features, services, or image possessed by the differentiated firm for large cost savings;
  • Buyers’ need for the differentiating factor falls. This can occur as buyers become more sophisticated;
  • Imitation narrows perceived differentiation, a common occurrence as industries mature.”

All differentiators should be on guard for firms that seek to imitate their distinct offerings while never charging a higher price than the market will bear [1].

The differentiation strategy should not be mistaken for providing unique products simply for the sake of being unique; rather the differentiation should be tied to customer demand or willingness to pay.


[1] Hill, Charles. W. L., & Jones, Gareth. R. (2007). Strategic Management Theory. Houghton Mifflin Company

[2] Porter, M. E. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. New York: Free Press, 1980.

Picture Copyright:  urubank / 123RF Stock


Strategic Analysis of ADP

To my surprise, one of the more popular blog posts on this site has been my excerpt from an MBA group paper drafted for a strategic management class (MGT 6125) taken back in the Spring of 2007 at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

The class was taught by the esteemed professor of strategy, Dr. Frank Rothaermel who literally wrote the book on strategic management. As part of the class our project group interviewed an executive from ADP (Mr. Greg Secord who went on to become President of ADP Canada), wrote a strategic analysis of the company and then presented our findings to the company (complete with Q&A).

Due to the aforementioned popularity of the excerpt that I authored, I have decided to post the paper in its entirety as written by me and other project members. Please keep in mind that this work was originally submitted on April 23, 2007 so please peruse the information with the proper context in mind. I must give credit where credit is due as this paper was put together by Brent Dutton, John Frazer, Jay Hornback, Kyungrok Jung, Chris Nygren, Anthony Smoak, Tom Whittingham,

Company Background

Automated Data Processing, Inc. is a company that many people have heard of but may not be fully aware of its value proposition. ADP processes payroll for 1 in 6 Americans [1]. While payroll processing is its core competency, it is not the organization’s only line of business worth highlighting. Tax filing, benefits administration and labor management are just a few of the company’s other services. The purpose of this analysis is to offer a better understanding of ADP as a company. We will offer insight into the functions that the organization performs, how they have maintained success and where they are headed as an organization.

ADP’s corporate culture and structure bolster its internal strengths and contribute to the company’s competitive advantage. In addition, expansion and integration have contributed to ADP’s unmatched growth in the industry. ADP’s business level strategies and unique competencies have also been a contributing factor in its growth. This strategic analysis offers a detailed inspection of each of these growth factors and as well as recommendations that should help foster future growth and success.

Before diving into the current state of the business and its strategy, it is important to understand the company’s past. In 1949, Henry Taub became the sole owner of what would become ADP at the age of 21 [2]. This humble beginning, managing one client’s payroll, would slowly snowball through the 1950s as more companies saw the value from payroll outsourcing. ADP expanded by absorbing “Mom and Pop” payroll processors in major U.S. cities and expanding their local clientele.

In the 1960s, ADP became a publicly traded company and continued its expansion strategy. It developed a Brokerage Services division which provided services for stock brokerages on Wall Street. The 1970s saw further domestic expansion as well as ADP’s first international office in The Netherlands. A new Dealer Services division was created to cater to the inventory and accounting needs of automobile dealers. The decade wrapped up with the creation of Claims Services, another valuable division positioned to automate insurance estimates for insurers.

The growing PC industry of the 1980s posed a serious threat to ADP as many companies could more feasibly perform ADP’s services in-house. However, ADP proved up to the challenge by turning that threat into a strength as they absorbed this new technology into their operations. The company crossed the $1 billion revenue mark in the mid-80s and found themselves in the perfect strategic position as outsourcing became trendy in the 1990s. Into the 2000s, ADP boasts 570,000+ clients, 42,000+ employees and $7 billion+ revenue as they continue to be a leader in the HR outsourcing industry.[3]

Industry Analysis

In order to analyze the industry in which ADP competes, Porter’s Five-Forces Model was applied. In the context of this model the competitive makeup of the employee services industry becomes clear.

Threat of Potential Entrants

The threat of potential entrants is relatively low as the result of significant barriers to entry. These include high switching costs for customers and large upfront capital investment for potential competitors. There is little upside to performing payroll processing correctly and significant consequences for performing it incorrectly. As a result, companies are leery of switching payroll providers, giving new entrants little chance of stealing customers from existing payroll firms and thereby limiting the size of the market for new entrants. A large initial capital investment is also needed to establish the hardware and software infrastructure needed to process high volumes of transactions efficiently and effectively. In addition, an extensive sales force needs to be in place to combat the industries largest substitute.


The threat of substitutes is high, and primarily revolves around the mindset of businesses wanting to process payroll themselves [4]. Some plausible reasons include not wanting to lose control of the financial books or being unaware of the cost savings associated with outsourcing functions like payroll [5]. Other substitutes include ERP software like Oracle and SAP.

On the larger scale there are two Macro-environmental forces that have an affect on the industry as a whole; the Technological and Macroeconomic environments. Technology has not only helped the industry to increase the speed in which it can process transactions, but it has also increased the reach of individual companies. For example, ADP began operations using paper and pen to process payrolls. Later they moved onto calculators, punch cards, and mainframes. The processing power of mainframes increased the number of daily transactions they could process and in turn helped to grow the business.[6]

Lastly, the Macroeconomic Environment can affect the potential of companies to attract new clients and maintain current revenue streams. During an economic downturn companies are less likely to spend capital on nonessential projects resulting in fewer new clients. Also, a reduction in a client’s workforce has a direct relationship to the amount of steady revenue received[7] because a smaller workforce equals fewer payroll transactions processed.

Strength of Buyers

The strength of the buyers in the payroll industry is proportionate to the size of the buyer, or more specifically, the number of employees the buyer has.  Recently, many of ADP’s clients in the fragmented financial services industry have begun to merge and consolidate. In fact, there are 770 fewer such institutions in 2007 than there were in 2000[8]. While this consolidation has not happened yet on a large enough scale to severely impact ADP’s margins, it may do so in the near future if the trend continues.

Intensity of Rivalry

For the first forty years that ADP was in business it enjoyed very little competition in its industry. This was due mainly to the fact that ADP had developed a series of in-house competencies using complex technology such as punch card computers and later mainframes to process their customers’ transactions.  Not many other companies had the expertise to handle this difficult technology efficiently and effectively.  However, the advent of the personal computer and user friendly software such as PeopleSoft greatly lowered technical barriers to entry into the industry. This resulted in the advent of numerous new competitors such as Paychex, Ceridian, and Administaff. Although the payroll industry is still dominated by a few players (ADP and Paychex primarily), the PEO and BPO industries that ADP operates in feature many competitors and intense competition. This has already led to price competition and if it continues will hurt ADP’s profit margins.

SWOT Analysis: Strengths

ADP recorded a robust financial performance for the time period 2004 – 2006. Revenue has increased over the past year at the rate of 10%, operating profits 10%, net profit 29%, and cash flow 14% respectively [9]. This financial strength is the foundation for ADP’s future growth. For this industry with small margins and a high cost of acquiring new business, client retention rate is very important. ADP’s average client tenure is estimated at ten plus years, which exceeds the industry’s average [10]. This has allowed ADP to enjoy very predictable recurring revenue streams. ADP’s broad range of offerings is also a strength. These include computerized payroll, transaction processing, data communications, and IT-based business solutions [11]. ADP can offer substantial scale advantage across all its product offerings, which enables it to cater to a larger customer base. As a main player in the industry, ADP consistently processes difficult, mundane, and high-volume transactions very efficiently at a comparatively low cost. Additionally, ADP has established effective and robust business channels through a highly trained and competent sales force of more than 4000 associates; something that is very difficult for competitors to imitate. On top of that, top management succession has been extremely smooth and has caused very little disruption since the 1950s [12]. Lastly, decentralized organization makes for smoother transitions during M&A periods.

SWOT Analysis: Weaknesses

Increasing consolidation in the financial services industry has resulted in the creation of larger entities with more bargaining power. These larger players have adversely affected the margins of the company. First, for the period of 2004 – 2006, ADP’s return on average assets, investments and average equity were 4.6%, 5.1% and 18.8%respectively. This is significantly lower than corresponding industry averages of 8.4%, 10.2% and 21.6% over the same period. Weak returns indicate the inability of the management to deploy assets profitably and can adversely affect investor confidence[13].

Another weakness is their very high dependence on the U.S. market. ADP earned nearly 83.7% of its revenues from the U.S. market in 2006 [14]. The company has a presence in Europe and Canada, but the comparative revenue is smaller. A domestic concentration of revenues makes ADP vulnerable to adverse market conditions in the U.S. Further, ADP doesn’t have a scale advantage in its international market. Having a relatively small presence in international market makes ADP vulnerable to certain foreign risks – dealing with legal systems, establishing distribution channels, finding trained people for the right position, etc. Lastly, ADP has lost much of its tradition of innovation. ADP had been successful in adopting new technology and in turning technological threats into opportunities. ADP was the first to introduce early computer machines into payroll systems. With the threat of mini-computers and PCs in the 1980s, ADP saw this new technology’s potential for company growth and integrated it successfully [15].  But, as the company grew, it became understandably more conservative in its pursuit of new technologies. As a result, ADP will now typically wait for a new technology to be commercially proven before it will consider adoption. Because the most likely disruptive force in ADP’s industry will come in the form of a new technology, ADP’s lack of product innovation and conservative approach to new technology could prove to be a weakness.

SWOT Analysis: Opportunities

ADP still has room for growth in the Domestic Markets. Current estimates place the small business sector at 10 million companies and of that, ADP only does business with 9% of this set [16].  Similar opportunities exist in the large business sector where ADP services 26% of employees [17]. ADP should also look to up-sale current customers who do not outsource their entire HR department. Finally, ADP needs to continue to evaluate foreign markets like India. As India’s citizens grow their annual salaries, so do the opportunities for ADP to offer their outsourcing products.

SWOT Analysis: Threats

The two primary threats that ADP faces are disruptive technology and both potential and current competitors. Up to this point, ADP has been able to adapt to changes in the technological environment. This includes adapting to the introduction of PCs by offering software solutions that resided at clients’ sites [18]. Potential competitors include companies like IBM, who have large amounts of capital and come from industries with lower expected ROI. Within ADP’s own industry, competitors like Paychex are growing rapidly. Today, Paychex focuses mainly on small size businesses [19].  However, as they continue to grow so does the potential that they will bleed into ADP’s market and become more direct competitors.

Competitive Position

Throughout its corporate history ADP has managed to positively differentiate itself relative to its competitors and achieve and maintain superior profitability compared to the industry average [20]. This is indicative of a sustained competitive advantage. In order to understand how ADP has differentiated itself through its competitive advantage, it is necessary to examine the sources of their advantage and understand how they continually reinforce each other. Though there are certainly numerous factors that have contributed to ADP’s success, probably the three key attributes that fuel its competitive advantage are the firm’s brand equity and reputation, its powerful sales force, and its ability to retain clients.

ADP was founded over fifty years ago and is the longest running payroll/HR company in its industry. This is actually quite a feat considering their industry and the types of services that they provide to their clients. By managing such highly visible, though mundane functions such as payroll, benefits and retirement services, ADP is put in an uncompromising position. If the company performs its job well, no one notices. But if it errs in its performance, many will notice and will likely exhibit a highly (negative) emotional response toward ADP. Therefore, in order to prosper in this “no fail” environment, ADP must continually prove to its clients and potential customers that it is extremely reliable and consistently good. Based on the fact that they have been steadily growing over the past fifty years, clearly ADP has managed to remain reliable. In doing so, ADP has built up major brand equity and is highly regarded in the industry. This solid reputation for consistent performance is the first source of their competitive advantage. The result of ADP’s strong brand and reputation come is its high revenues and solid profits. This puts ADP in a healthy financial position, and ultimately allows them to support a large sales force of over 4000 sales associates [21]. ADP’s large sales force is their second source of competitive advantage.

It is their sales force that allows ADP to have a personal presence in every single deal that they pursue [22] (uncommon in today’s world of web and phone based sales). This results in new business growth beyond that of their competitors and a greater brand equity, reinforcing their first source of competitive advantage. Further, in order to effectively compete with ADP, competitors must be able to finance a large sales force of their own. Not many firms have the capital to do this, which provides a high barrier to entry in ADP’s industry. Additionally, ADP uses its sales force to continually serve the clients that it already has. This ensures that there is always someone to personally handle any issues or meet any requirements that a client may have. Due to this highly responsive and effective service provided to its clients, ADP has enjoyed an average client tenure of over ten years [23]. It is this high client retention level that is their third source of competitive advantage.

Keeping the clients that it earns for ten years or more provides a number of benefits to ADP beyond simple client familiarity. First, it prevents market share erosion – once a client goes with ADP, they are very unlikely to leave for a competing firm. Second, it provides an industry barrier to entry because with fewer potential companies to target (since ADP has walled off a large number of clients already), competitors are less likely to enter the industry. Third, and probably most important, ADP’s lengthy client tenure translates into over 90% of its revenues being recurring. This puts ADP in an extremely healthy position financially because not only does it have guaranteed revenue streams, but it also allows the company to plan financial moves years in advance with an extremely high degree of accuracy. ADP can then use its revenue streams to fund its sales force, which in turn strengthens its brand equity, which in turn helps gain and retain clients.

ADP’s reinforcing sources of competitive advantage are very powerful and continue to build upon themselves. These competitive advantages are very difficult to imitate.  This has ultimately allowed ADP to differentiate itself in the industry (See Appendix A). As a result of this differentiation, ADP can charge a premium on its services. This premium is very important in terms of profitability since ADP operates in a relatively low margin industry.

Market Segmentation

ADP has divided their offerings into two main divisions. The primary division is their Employer Services Division that covers all HR offerings as well as the corporate tax services. Employer Services is broken down by company size into three segments for sales purposes. The smallest segment (Small Business Servies) includes all companies with 50 employees or less and represents $0.9 billion in annual revenue [24]. The middle segment (Major Account Services) includes companies that range from 50 employees to less than 1000 employees and represents $1.7 billion in annual revenue [25].

The final segment (National Account Services) is the large employer segment, made up of companies with more than 1000 employees. The National Account Services segment represents $1.6 billion in annual revenue. ADP has strong market penetration in the Major and National Account segments but is currently dealing with slowed growth within these segments. ADP must look to expand into the Small Business segment to grow their market share. This may prove difficult because smaller companies are very price conscious and ADP charges a premium rate for their services. To expand into this price competitive market ADP will have to demonstrate to these companies that it is less costly to outsource payroll and other functions to ADP than it is to do those functions in-house.

Additional revenues in the Employer Services division are gained through ADP’s total source PEO service and product oriented business units. The product oriented business units are comprised of tax, retirement, and pre-employment services. While the PEO service represents only $0.7 billion in annual revenue we feel that this is another growth segment that ADP can focus on. The entire employer services division provided ADP with $5.7 billion in annual revenue in FY 2006.

ADP’s second division is the Dealer Services division which provides multi-purpose software packages for auto dealers. The Dealer Services market is also split into three market segments. The largest segment of the dealer services market is the Domestic Auto Dealers. The second segment represents International Auto Dealers. Finally, ADP’s third segment is the Recreational Vehicle and Commercial Truck Segment. Altogether, Dealer services has 25,500 customers representing $1.6 billion in annual revenues.

Business Level Strategy

ADP has three main business level strategies. The most important strategy focuses on using “solid time tested operating principles”[26]. By utilizing proven operational methods and products for all services ADP is able to provide solid, consistent performance in all market segments. This reliable consistency is especially critical given the nature of ADP’s services. Mistakes in processes such as payroll are highly visible to employees and employers. If ADP were not able to deliver this consistent service their clients would leave in droves. Thanks to ADP’s reliable operations and core knowledge of the transaction services business they can boast over a 90% client retention rate.

The second main business strategy stems from ADP’s decentralized corporate structure. By making decisions at the lower levels of management, ADP is able to deliver superior service to their clients. The flat corporate structure allows for flexibility and incremental improvements in services that are unhindered by bureaucratic obstacles. Because of this, ADP is able to quickly respond to and fill customer needs faster than their competitors. This strategy will become more important as ADP begins to expand into the Small Business segment where customers will have more specialized demands.

The final business level strategy is the direct sales force employed at ADP. By maintaining a sales force of over 4,000 dedicated field representatives ADP is able to include a personal touch on almost every business transaction. As mentioned earlier in the paper ADP’s sales force is seen as a competitive advantage by itself. By saturating the marketplace with well trained, capable sales personnel ADP is able to nurture and capitalize on personal relationships. While this is a competitive advantage it is also extremely costly. The high costs associated with the sales force could be ADP’s greatest weakness in targeting the lower margin Small Business market. Because of this higher cost, ADP has begun to experiment with telephone and web-based sales pitches to target the Small Business market. Using these less expensive marketing channels will allow ADP to quickly and inexpensively contact a greater number of small businesses and hopefully increase their client base within this market.

Mergers and Acquisitions

ADP has become highly successful in its strategy of pursuing growth via horizontal integration. Although current CEO Gary Butler has maintained that ADP has no interest in “large, dilutive, multiyear acquisitions” [27], the company actively acquires smaller industry competitors. Acquisitions give ADP the opportunity to grow inorganically, increase its product offerings, acquire technology and reduce the level of rivalry in its industry.

A perfect execution of this strategy can be seen in its January 2003 acquisition of Probusiness. Probusiness was a much smaller California based provider of payroll and human resources services. Before the acquisition, Probusiness cited eight large competitors who had an interest in acquiring them. An acquisition of Probusiness would give a larger company an opportunity to expand its share of the payroll business [28]. Amongst those eight competitors were notable companies such as International Business Machines Inc. (IBM), Microsoft Corp. and Electronic Data Systems Corp. (EDS) [13]. True to form, ADP decided to react and proceeded to acquire Probusiness. The acquisition effectively prevented large competitors from acquiring approximately 600 new payroll clients in the larger employer space and reduced future competition.

The Probusiness acquisition was also a boon to the company in the fact that it offered ADP advanced payroll processing technology. Probusiness utilized PC based payroll processing as opposed to ADP’s more mainframe based technology [13].

A key acquisition for ADP in terms of increasing its global footprint was the December 2005 acquisition of U.K. based Kerridge Computer. This particular acquisition was significant in the fact that it increased ADP’s Dealer Management Services (DMS) presence from fourteen countries to over forty one [29].

ADP along with its main DMS competitors in the European market, Reynolds & Reynolds and SAP, began to realize the significant growth opportunities for the region. The European market for DMS, unlike the United States market, is much more fragmented which means there are more opportunities for a larger player to standardize product offerings [30]. In 2003 the European Union lifted rules that had previously banned franchised car dealers from selling rival brands [15]. Demand for pan-European systems to help multi-brand dealers manage their stores, sometimes in multiple countries and in various languages increased dramatically [15]. ADP shrewdly realized that many smaller DMS providers would not be able to meet this demand and acquired Kerridge to bolster its position.

Strategically, the Kerridge acquisition has allowed ADP to have first mover advantage over its main competitors with respect to China. New vehicle sales growth in Asia is expected to be at 25.3% by the year 2011 [31]. By becoming a first mover in the region, ADP will have the opportunity to lock customers into its technology since it currently has a 96% client retention rate16. ADP will also have the opportunity to create high switching costs for its customers and make it difficult for rivals to take its customers.

Other recent acquisitions by ADP include Taxware, which brings tax-content and compliance solutions to the table; VirtualEdge, which offers tools for recruiting; Employease, which develops Web-based HR and benefits applications; and Mintax, which provides tools for corporate tax incentives [32].” All of these acquisitions represent small fast growing companies with complimentary products and services. These products and services can be incorporated in ADP’s vast distribution network and provide potential bundling, cross-selling, or up-selling  opportunities with ADP’s current offerings.

Culture, Structure, and Control Systems

Top management at ADP plays an important role in maintaining and advancing the culture created by its founders. The promotion of the core values by top managers sets the tone for the entire organization. ADP stresses the following three core values: 1.) treat everyone with honesty, fairness, and respect; 2.) conduct business with the highest level of integrity; 3.) open, informal communications, hard work, and prudent financial management [33]. Adhering to these values has created a culture of prudent risk taking, continuous improvement, and promotion from within based on ability. As a company that built its core business around delivering first class applications to its client base, maintaining an environment where employees advance their careers based on their ability to improve services is essential because better services lead to higher client satisfaction.  Client satisfaction is the most important metric for client retention, and retention is imperative for a mature company with 46,000 employees and 570,000 clients [34].

Creating incentives for employees to adopt and adapt new technologies will be paramount as ADP begins to embrace the software-as-a-service platform. Collaboration and incremental innovation occur naturally at ADP as a byproduct of its relatively flat, multidivisional organizational structure. As a result managing change during a paradigm shift should be relatively painless for the company. ADP’s flat corporate structure meshes well with its core values and business objectives. ADP avoids excess management layers in favor of decentralized authority and empowered product teams. These empowered associates respond well to this structure as it gives them a better sense of their mission, their accomplishments, and their accountability. Ultimately this leads to happier employees and better service levels [35]. Better service levels lead to longer relationships with ADP, expanded service offerings and more references to other companies who use ADP’s products and services [36].

As mentioned above, ADP advocates incremental innovation and relies heavily on outsiders to produce new products or platforms. Once the benefits of the technology are well known, ADP leverages the new technology to enhance its product offerings. This strategy has fewer risks and lower costs as opposed to investing directly in R&D and innovating internally. Streamlined implementations with aggressive timelines – most are completed in less than one year [37] – allow ADP to catch up quickly and capitalize on the advances along with the first movers. Dedicated cross-functional product teams “live with” the product implementation from its initial project management stages to the final testing and quality assurance phase. These experienced and focused teams deliver new products in half the time of most competitors. ADP also has strategic control systems in place to ensure products continue to meet their high quality standards. The Product Marketing Council and Product Steering Committee meet regularly to evaluate the quality of their products and services in terms of how effectively they meet the client’s business needs and how reliably the applications actually perform. Managers at these meetings also examine industry trends and external product innovations and assess the need to change platforms or introduce new products to ADP.


Over the past fifty years, ADP has a history of planned long-term growth. In the past twelve months, ADP divested their Claims and Brokerage Service businesses. ADP has made a clear strategic focus on the Employer and Dealer Service businesses, part of the new “Fit and Focused” ADP brand. Below are two strategic recommendations for ADP that mesh well with its strengths and the opportunities present in the industry.

Inorganic Growth in Employer Services

ADP has been very successful in matching organic growth with inorganic growth through mergers and acquisitions. Currently, the Professional Employer Organization, or PEO segment of the Employer Services business, is highly fragmented with solid expected growth. In some domestic PEO markets, ADP will be able to grow their presence with their existing ADP Total Source package. New regulations make California a prime market to expand with PEO services [38].

However, the PEO market as a whole is highly fragmented. Currently, over 700 firms provide PEO services to small businesses throughout the US. The overall market penetration of PEO services is about 2.5% with annual growth of about 20%. ADP is in a unique position to grow in this segment because ADP has the largest capital structure (see Appendix B) [39]. ADP could greatly accelerate their growth in this promising market through continued mergers and acquisitions.

Dealer Services in the Booming Chinese Auto Market

As mentioned in latter portion of the Mergers and Acquisitions section, ADP acquired Kerridge Computer which expanded the Dealer Services business internationally. The Dealer Management Service, or DMS, industry will continue to have steady growth in North America and Western Europe. The largest, long-term growth potential, however, is in the Chinese automotive market. The growing economy and shift from institutional vehicle purchases to individual purchases are the primary reasons for a need to increase ADP’s DMS presence in China.

“China’s auto demand is expected to rise to 10 million in 2010, second only to North America,” says Zhang Xiaoqiang, Vice Minister of the State Development and Reform Commission [40].

Currently, the automotive market in China is around 2 million vehicles per year. Thus the projections of the Chinese government equate to 20-30% growth over the next several years [41].

The automotive growth in China also lends to growth in the DMS industry because the Chinese auto market is switching from an institutional sellers market to an individual consumer buyers market [42]. The switch in customer base will put an increased need for dealerships to provide more personalized and generally better customer service. DMS systems can help dealerships manage their business more effectively while focusing more time on building their customer base and nurturing customer relationships. ADP clearly has a focus on the growing Chinese automotive market with its recent announcement with BMW of China [43]. Building on that, ADP needs to continue to focus resources and energy on the great opportunity China’s automotive market provides.



[2] Kanarkowski, Edward J., ADP 50th Anniversary Book, Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 1999.


[4] Secord, Greg, VP of Marketing, ADP NAS, 30 March 2007 (verbal conversation)

[5] Secord, Greg, VP of Marketing, ADP NAS, 30 March 2007 (verbal conversation)

[6] ADP, 50th Anniversary : 1949 – 1999, p.5. p. 14

[7] Secord, Greg, VP of Marketing, ADP NAS, 30 March 2007 (verbal conversation)

[8] Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Company Profile, DataMonitor, p. 8.

[9] Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Company Profile, DataMonitor, p. 5.

[10] Secord, Greg, VP of Marketing, ADP NAS, 30 March 2007 (verbal conversation)

[11] ADP, Focus on growth : 2006 summary annual report, 2006.

[12] ADP, 50th Anniversary : 1949 – 1999,

[13] Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Company Profile, DataMonitor, p. 6.

[14] Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Company Profile, DataMonitor, p. 6

[15] ADP, 50th Anniversary : 1949 – 1999, p.5. p. 30.,

[16] Rubel, Brian, Sales Executive, ADP NAS, 25 February 2007 (verbal conversation)

[17] Secord, Greg, VP of Marketing, ADP NAS, 30 March 2007 (verbal conversation)

[18] ADP, 50th Anniversary : 1949 – 1999, p.5. p. 30

[19] Paychex 2006 10k report……………………………..

[20]ADP, 50th Anniversary : 1949 – 1999, p.43

[21] Rubel, Brian, Sales Executive, ADP NAS, 25 February 2007 (verbal conversation)

[22] Secord, Greg, VP of Marketing, ADP NAS, 30 March 2007 (verbal conversation)

[23] Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Company Profile, DataMonitor, p. 6




[27] Simon, Ellen “ADP chief looks at expansion, not acquisition” ASSOCIATED PRESS (7 March 2007)

[28] Gelfand, Andrew “ADP Seen Holding Off Competition With ProBusiness Buy” Dow Jones News Service (6  January 2003) :Factiva

[29] Kisiel, Ralph “Reynolds, ADP aim for European growth” Automotive News Europe Volume 11; Nbr 3 (6 February 2006) :Factiva

[30] Jackson, Kathy “Dealer software market is booming; Multibranding boosts demand for dealership management programs” Automotive News Europe, Volume 11; Number 21 (16 October 2006) :Factiva

[31] ADP Annual Financial Analyst Conference Call Presentation. March 22, 2007

[32] Taulli ,Tom “ADP Tries Getting Even Better” Motley Fool  (November 2, 2006) Accessed 4/14/07 <


[34] Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Company Profile, DataMonitor, p. 6


[36] Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Annual Financial Analyst Conference, “Strategic Growth Program”, Slide 16, March 22, 2007

[37] Notes from meeting with ADP executive on 3/30/07

[38] ADP. (2007). 2006 Annual Report. Retrieved March 24th, 2007 from

[39] Gordon, Benjamin and Gordon, Matt, “The PEO Industry in Transition,” HRO Today, June 2006.

[40] Gluckman, Ron, “Shifting into High Gear,” The Silk Road, April 2004

[41] Lienert, Dan. “The Rising Chinese Auto Market,’, December 2003.

[42] Hemerling, Jim, Jin, David, and Chen, Forrest, “Winning in Today’s Chinese Automotive Market,” The Boston Consulting Group, June 2005

[43] ADP. (2007). ADP Press Release. “ADP Announces Major Contract With BMW China Automotive,” February 2007.

Michael Porter’s Generic Cost Leadership Strategy Explained


Back when I was a heads down developer analyst working at General Motors, my mindset was completely focused on being a data expert and techie. At the time I did not have a broader understanding of business concepts and business strategies. Thus, I considered myself a “one dimensional” resource (a very competent one dimensional resource but one dimensional nonetheless). I set out to remedy my blind spots by acquiring business knowledge so I would have an understanding of broader concepts, become less myopic, and position myself favorably in the marketplace against other one dimensional techies (like myself at that time).

Subsequently, it was in business school where I first learned of American academic Dr. Michael E. Porter of Harvard Business School fame. Mr. Porter is regarded as the preeminent thought leader in the area of business strategy and competitiveness.

Generic Competitive Strategies:

I found value in studying and discussing Porter’s framework that defined generic competitive strategies. A generic competitive strategy is a business level strategy that companies adopt in order to obtain a competitive advantage. The strategies are termed generic because they can be pursued by any and every company across a range of industries. The three primary strategies employed in the framework are:

Cost Leadership (low cost structure, e.g. Wal-Mart, Dell, Southwest Airlines)
Differentiation (offering unique product and services for a premium, e.g. Apple, BMW, Starbucks)
Focus (limiting scope to narrow market segments, e.g. local restaurant or local service provider)


These three strategies help contextualize how businesses aim to obtain profits in their respective marketplaces; they also help businesses understand how they can seek new opportunities for advantage. Porter originally emphasized that a company should target only one of the strategies in the framework or risk paying a “straddling penalty” (a la the doomed airline offshoot Continental Lite). Porter later softened his stance in this regard recognizing the benefits of a hybrid approach in some cases.

Cost Leadership Strategy:

This post focuses on cost leadership because it’s the strategy that relates tangentially to IT and the concept of globalization. As IT workers are aware, the forces of globalization have no mercy in their enablement of companies to offshore work in an attempt to lower costs. This outsourcing of IT work to offshore firms is happening at organizations such as Disney, the University of California and [Insert Any Bank Name Here]. Obviously not all technology related offshoring is done in order to focus on a cost leadership strategy but the activity’s initial intent is to lower a firm’s IT cost structure (refer to my post on how IT has to do a better job communicating its value).

Returning to the main point, the cost leadership strategy is employed when a company aims to be the lowest cost producer in the market. Strategic managers in the organization make a concerted effort to lower business costs in order to achieve a competitive advantage. A lower cost structure enables a business to reap higher than average profitability.

Businesses attempting to implement this strategy may aim to increase inventory turnover, lower their wage expenses and/or manufacturing costs, gain bargaining power over suppliers, develop distinctive competencies in logistics, develop low cost distribution channels or any combination thereof. As an aside, I could prattle on ad-nauseam about Wal-Mart and how its technological capabilities provided the organization significant advantages (and I have here: Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3).


When the cost leader and another company decide to compete in the same price range for the same customers, the cost leader will have the inherent advantage because it will reap higher profits due to its lower cost structure. The cost leader will be able to weather the “price war” due to its lower cost structure advantage.

“The cost leader chooses a low to moderate level of product differentiation relative to its competitors. Differentiation is expensive; the more a company expends resources to make its products distinct, the more its costs rise. The cost leader aims for a level of differentiation obtainable at a low cost. Wal-Mart, for example does not spend hundreds of millions of dollars on store design to create an attractive shopping experience as chains like Macy’s, Dillard’s, or Saks Fifth Avenue have done.” [1]

The cost leader also positions its products to appeal to the “average customer”. The aim is to provide the least number of products desired by the highest number of customers. Although customers may not find exactly what they are seeking, they are attracted to the lower prices [1].


Since the strategy involves providing the lowest costs, companies must strive for a large market share when employing this strategy. The cost leadership strategy has been linked to lower customer brand loyalty which in turn means that customers can be swayed by lower priced substitutes from other competitors.

Additionally, as technological change enters the marketplace, new competitors can attack cost leaders through innovation thus nullifying the cost leader’s accumulated advantages. For example, Amazon has accumulated substantial knowledge and proficiencies in the online e-tail space and has placed Wal-Mart on the defensive in this arena as Wal-Mart’s expertise is tailored to its brick and mortar assets.

Or as foretold in Porter-speak back in his 1996 HBR article “What is Strategy”,

“A company may have to change its strategy if there are major structural changes in its industry. In fact, new strategic positions often arise because of industry changes and new entrants unencumbered by history often can exploit them more easily.” [2]


[1] Hill, Charles. W. L., & Jones, Gareth. R. (2007). Strategic Management Theory. Houghton Mifflin Company

[2] Porter, M. E. “What Is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review 74, no. 6 (November–December 1996): 61–78.

Header Image Copyright: olivier26 / 123RF Stock Photo</a>

Diagram Image By Denis Fadeev – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0,

More Than You Want to Know About State Street Bank’s Technology Strategy Part 1


In November of 2010, Investment Management firm State Street Bank publicly announced an overall transformation of its technology infrastructure. State Street is a massively sized transaction services provider to both mutual and pension fund managers. The custodian bank holds $23 trillion in investor accounts in 29 countries around the world. In an organization with a massive store of data (most of it subjected to regulatory oversight), enterprise wide data conformity and accessibility is a challenge.

In a case of business strategy/need influencing information technology strategy, State Street’s COO in 2009 (Jay Hooley) wanted to help an institutional client calculate its exposure to a particular market. The information request was highly urgent given the financial consequences of late reactions during the great recession. “Getting the numbers turned into a painful exercise as State Street’s middle- and front-office staffers reconciled disparate data sets housed in different client systems and in nine of State Street’s 29 global locations” (Fest 2013). This failure to deliver for the client in an instantaneous manner spurred Hooley to call upon his information technology leadership to present a strategy to address this business need. The result of the IT leadership planning effort was the idea to move the bank’s diverse legacy infrastructure to a more standardized and nimble cloud computing architecture.

State Street: Strategy for Technology Infrastructure:

Former State Street CIO Chris Perretta, who as of 2016 holds a similar position at MUFG America’s Holdings Corporation, spent a considerable amount of time evangelizing the benefits of cloud computing to both the business and the bank’s board members. In its early stages, the technology vision resulting from the COO’s planning request was to position an updated infrastructure as a competitive advantage for the business in terms of cost savings, automation, and future development efficiency. Furthermore, the updated infrastructure could be an enabler of new product revenue streams. It should be noted that a shift to the cloud for a financial organization the size of State Street was unusual. “Too Big to Fail” sized banks are not typically known for their innovative technology development. Derisively, the bank has been known as “Staid Street” for its conservative manner. Within financial services, innovation is usually the domain of smaller, nimbler “fintech” startups looking for scalability and speed to market.

From an infrastructure perspective, State Street embarked upon migrating from disparate legacy data centers running proprietary Unix servers to a standardized cloud architecture based upon commoditized x86 servers running Linux. The initial cloud service was built from a Massachusetts based disaster recovery center and the bank currently has six major data centers in the U.S., Europe and Asia along with three backup facilities (Brodkin, 2011). In addition to the rollout of virtualization capabilities and distributed database functionality, Perretta states, “New tools for provisioning, change control, load balancing, a common security framework and various types of instrumentation to enable multi-tenant infrastructures are all part of the mix” (Brodkin, 2011).

Traditionally State Street has relied upon the “build rather than buy” approach as it builds customized software (development traditionally accounting for ~20%-25% of annual IT budget) to meet its needs (CMP TechWeb, 2012). The standardized cloud platform now enables developers to reuse code for future development which can shorten project timeframes.

State Street: Strategy for IT Capability & Staffing:

State Street’s IT organizational structure can be characterized as federalism. With the federalist approach, the organization gains the benefit of having centralized leadership and vision at the “top of the house”, yet allows decentralized co-located IT groups to remain responsive to their respective divisions. As described by former CIO Perretta, “We line up delivery capacity with each unit, and each CIO is responsible for delivering business services to that unit” (MacSweeney, 2009). For example, The CIO has a direct report on the ground in China where the company operates a subsidiary (State Street Technology Zhejiang Co). Furthermore, the bank is tolerant of “skunk works” style projects that organically develop in different IT divisions throughout the enterprise (MacSweeny, 2009).

On the centralized side of the federalist equation, the bank operates a shared services group that is responsible for technical necessities distributed throughout the enterprise (i.e. security, information and communications). This federalized approach makes sense for a sprawling organization that is comprised of disparate business operations across its custodian bank, investment management, investment research and global divisions.

With the introduction of the cloud infrastructure at State Street, the technology staffing vision is to acquire individuals with architectural knowledge who can think “big picture” yet are able to wallow in the details as necessary. The bank employs a chief architect whose aim is to drive technology innovation that leads to strategies that will impact the business in an advantageous manner. Perretta states, “We don’t use him to manage projects; we use him to come up with the ideas that make sense for our business community. Now he does those pilots, and then we industrialize them for the rest of the organization” (Tucci, 2011).

To be continued in Part 2 and Part 3 where I address additional areas such as:

  • Strategy for Information Risk & Security
  • Strategy for Stakeholder Requirements, Testing & Training/Support
  • Project ROI and Key Success Measures
  • Strategy for Data Acquisition and Impact on Business Processes
  • Strategy for Social Media/Web Presence
  • Strategy for Organizational Change Management, Project Strategy and Complexity


Brodken, J. (April, 14, 2011). State Street modernizing with cloud, Linux technologies; Virtualization, open source drive cloud project at State Street. Network World Fusion. Retrieved from Factiva 6/19/2016

CMP TechWeb. (June, 25, 2012). State Street Private Cloud: $600 Million Savings Goal. Retrieved from Factiva 6/19/2016

Fest, G. (January 1, 2013). State Street’s Dig (Data); Championed by CEO Jay Hooley, boston-based state street is remapping a huge technology infrastructure to reap the benefits of the cloud and big data. American Banker Magazine. Vol.123, No.1. Retrieved from Factiva

MacSweeney, G. (August, 1, 2009). Serious Innovation; CIO Christopher Perretta supports all of State Street’s IT needs by mixing new technologies and rapid development and even encouraging ‘skunk works’ experimentation when appropriate. Wall Street & Technology. Retrieved from Factiva

Tucci. L. (July, 2011). In search of speed, State Street’s CIO builds a private cloud. Retrieved from

Photo courtesy of DAVID L. RYAN/GLOBE STAFF

Enterprise Risk Management at Microsoft

This is a brief writeup from an Enterprise Risk Management class that I took back in 2013. The case describes Microsoft from the mid to late 90’s and its efforts to implement an Enterprise Risk Management group. The case mentions former head of treasury Brent Callinicos, who went on to become a regional CFO at Microsoft and the CFO for Uber.

For those who are interested in the case details, check out “Making Enterprise Risk Management Pay Off: How Leading Companies Implement Risk Management” by Thomas L. Barton, William G. Shenkir & Paul L. Walker.


Historically, the technology sector has always been subjected to swift, rapid changes. Microsoft has always tried to anticipate new threats and technology advances (i.e. dealing with both existing risks and unanticipated risks). Back in the late 1990’s, technological changes due to the rise of the internet provided Microsoft a different landscape from the historical era of the unconnected, standalone PC. In Microsoft’s 1999 annual report, the first item discussed under “issues and uncertainties” is “rapid technological change and competition”[1].

Additionally as the mid 90’s era Microsoft launched new products, it also ventured into new business models. The launch of Expedia in 1996 positioned Microsoft as a player in the travel agency business and its Home Advisor product made the company a licensed mortgage broker. These novel business models exposed the organization to a new set of risks, which in-turn exposed the risk management group to new challenges.

Moving to an Enterprise-wide Risk Management Approach

Microsoft has always competed in a very competitive landscape replete with technologically savvy competitors and condensing product life cycles. As a result, an enterprise wide commitment to risk management was a necessary and prudent choice to remain competitive in the company’s markets.

The momentum that triggered a more enterprise wide view of risks at the company was the establishment of the risk management group in 1997. Prior to 1997, there was no such group to start the process of implementing an ERM framework. Within the treasury group, the risk management group head Brent Callinicos (also notably the eventual CFO of Uber) set out to develop a consolidated risk identification, measurement and management approach.

The treasury group started with finance risk management changes by increasing the complexity and effectiveness of VAR analyses. Furthermore, treasury presented a paper to the finance committee of the board of directors that analyzed the derivative losses of several major companies. This report precipitated a more integrated approach to the various financial risks handled within treasury. The creation of Gibraltar (a treasury information system) allowed the company to view all of its risks “holistically rather than on a silo basis” [1].

From a business risk perspective, the risk management group worked closely with business unit managers in order to develop risk-financing plans and to aid business units with appropriate quantitative risk modeling. This evangelist approach was an effective method for gaining buy-in regarding the risk management group’s aims.

Microsoft’s Enterprise Risk Management Structure

Microsoft’s risk management group is nestled within the treasury function of the organization. The leader of the risk management group is the corporate treasurer who reports directly to the CFO. Treasury manages somewhere in the neighborhood of $80 billion for the software company [2]. Business risk is divided into worldwide products, worldwide sales & support and worldwide operations. The company does not have a CRO as it decided that a CRO would not be practical.

In my opinion, I believe that Microsoft housed their risk management under the treasury function because they viewed a standalone risk organization under a CRO as duplicative. Treasurers concentrate primarily on managing financial risks but by nature must also be generalists with respect to many types of risk. In a multinational technology company such as Microsoft, various market currency risks exist that require appropriate anticipation and response.

Microsoft is inherently technologically driven. The company has very smart, knowledgeable people naturally embedded into its lines of business. These smart people understand the risks of their technological products and desire to see these products succeed. To the benefit of the organization, the embedded personnel have an inherently risk minded mentality. Therefore the job of the risk management group is to partner with and support the lines of business and various operations groups by adding “incremental value”; i.e. information that the business units may not have considered.

“Microsoft is first run by the product group, then maybe by sales, and finance and risk management will come after that. The risk management group or treasury group will not run the company”[1].

Microsoft previously looked at risk in separate silos. In order to look at risk holistically, the risk management group had to step back and take a strategic assessment, which is a much more challenging endeavor. With this holistic approach, the grouping or correlation of risks are considered as opposed to dealing with one specific risk at a time. For example, Microsoft considered property insurance as the legacy best way to manage the risk of building damage in an earthquake. With a new scenario analysis approach employed by the risk management group, additional risks must be considered that are correlated to property damage. This new correlation mentality required partnering with multiple areas of the company to incorporate additional risks for an appropriate risk assessment.

Use of Scenario Analysis

Scenario analysis is used to understand the risks with respect to situations where it is very hard to quantify or measure the precise impact to the organization. Sequences of events regarding severe earthquake damage or severe shocks to the stock market are risks that are difficult to quantitatively measure and thus scenario-based tactics are applicable to try and gauge the fallout. Additionally, Microsoft uses scenario analysis to conduct stress testing which consider hard to measure impacts of political and geographic circumstances. An order of magnitude approach is used in scenario analysis as opposed to an exact measurement approach. Microsoft uses qualitative language such as, “..the quantification of business risks is not exact…”  and , “Does this feel about right for this risk” in their scenario analyses.

Once the risk management group has identified the risks associated with each scenario, it then partners with other business units to understand impacts. The risk group will also investigate other external organizations that have experienced similar events in order to learn how these organizations weathered their experiences.

The Main Benefits of Enterprise Risk Management

One substantial benefit for Microsoft in moving to an ERM approach is that the company can view and assess its risks holistically as opposed to assessing risks in an independent/uncorrelated fashion. This is evident in initiatives such as the company’s Gibraltar treasury system which provides an aggregated view of market risks.

Another benefit is that the risk management group works across the organizational footprint and can provide input to various groups so that each group can “stay current on what is happening in the business” [1]. The risk management group can diffuse information across the organization by working closely with business unit managers. Face time with product and operations managers allows the risk group to understand risks across the enterprise which contributes to a holistic understanding.

This approach is mutually beneficial for both groups as the risk group gains understanding of new risks (continuous cataloging of risks) and the business units gain insight into risks they may not have previously considered.

“By having the business units educate us on the intricate details of their business, the risk management group can be aware of perhaps 90 percent of the risks facing Microsoft”[1].

Closing Thoughts

At Microsoft, the risk management group doesn’t necessarily have to posses the all-encompassing best risk solution for every line of business. Risk management considers the product managers and the respective lines of business as the most knowledgeable sources of risk within their own domains. The risk group is on hand to provide additional insight for incremental improvement and to enhance or build upon the risk knowledge already contained within the lines of business.

This approach makes sense for a technology company that is teeming with very risk aware and knowledgeable personnel at the operational levels who are designing or working with complex products.

In my work experience at a traditional bank, the risk group was assumed to have the best procedures, templates and analyses with respect to handling credit, market and operating risks.  From Microsoft I have learned that highly efficient and capable risk management can also be a synthesis of understandings from risk management proper and the lines of business.


[1] Barton,T., Shenkir,W., Walker, P. (2002). Making Enterprise Risk Management Pay Off.

[2] Groenfeldt, T.  (Nov, 2013). Microsoft Treasury Wins Best Risk Management Award. Forbes.

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